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Abstract 
The fragile nature of eyewitness memory makes the witnesses susceptible to various 
sources of post event information. Many factors of individual differences further 
moderate the impact of misinformation. The experiment reported here attempts to 
explore the effects of post event information on recognition accuracy of witnessed 
events, as moderated by the arousal states of energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic 
tone and anger/frustration. Experiment used those participants who scored high on four 
arousal states and average on rest of the three arousal states. Participants viewed a 
video clip, depicting a murder, followed by presentation of one week delayed post 
event information and recognition test for details of the event. Results indicated that 
participants who were misled retained less number of details of the event than did the 
participants who were given either consistent or no post event information. High scorer 
energetic arousal and hedonic tone participants retained more details of the event 
than did the high scorer tense arousal and anger/frustration participants under all the 
three post event information conditions. However, high tense arousal and 
anger/frustration participants’ eyewitness retention dropped more sharply when they 
were given misleading post event information in comparison to the high energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone participants. Thus, results of the study indicated a moderating 
effect of post event information by the arousal states. 
 
Keywords: arousal states, eyewitness accuracy, misinformation effect, post event 
information. 
 
 
People occasionally encounter with some highly emotional events like brutal murder, 
robbery, sexual molestation, etc. They accordingly register, encode and store these 
details and reproduce or recognize them when required to do so. The accuracy of 
recall of witnessed event is the extent to which people reproduce or recognize these 
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details perfectly. Some of the details, which are often required to be reproduced or 
recognized, are the contents, people, objects, actions and processes of the event. 
As an organism endures any unexpected sequence of disturbing and heart-rending 
situation he becomes emotionally so over-charged that he apart from being 
stunned also undergoes a state of stupefaction. Howsoever disturbing such an event 
might be to a person, he finds it very difficult to testify for legal procedures the exact 
sequence of happenings at a later point of time. The confusion becomes worse 
confounded by the addition of further inputs from the media and other sources. 
 
Several laboratory studies support the view that memory for details of emotionally 
arousing events is less accurate than memory for details of neutral events (Morgan, 
Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, Barnoski, & Southwick, 2004; Stark, Okado, & 
Loftus, 2010; Valentine, & Mesout, 2009). Past researches on eyewitness testimony (e. 
g., Belli, 1989; Gupta, & Sondhi, 2009; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; 
Saunders, & MacLeod, 2002) have repeatedly demonstrated that misleading post 
event information may negatively impact the accuracy of eyewitness memory of 
participants. In one of such studies, Loftus and Loftus (1975) showed their research 
participants a film of a traffic accident and then two groups of participants were 
asked slightly different questions. One of the groups was asked: “How fast were the 
cars going when they hit each other?” The other group was asked: “How fast were 
the cars going when they smashed into each other?” In a one week delayed 
retention test the participants were asked whether they had seen any broken glass in 
the film resulting from the accident. Although there had not been any, the second 
group distinctly remembered having seen the broken glass scattered about the 
road. Apparently, the words of the question had cued their expectations. 
 
This phenomenon is known as "suggestibility" or "misinformation effect" for which 
Loftus and her co-workers (Loftus et al., 1989) have proposed 'memory impairment 
hypothesis'. This hypothesis states that misleading post event information alters a 
person's memory for original episode by somehow 'erasing' or 'overwriting' the 
original memory trace. It asserts that the destructive updating of original memory 
trace results in systematic and predictable deficits in performance on subsequent 
tests (see Loftus, 2005, for a review of the misinformation effect). 
 
The memory impairment hypothesis was challenged by McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985) who advanced the 'co-existence hypothesis', which assumes that the original 
memory trace is unaffected by post event information. The two researchers used an 
alternate procedure to test eyewitness accuracy, termed as the modified test 
procedure, in which the misleading information was not included in the option on 
the test and argued that for a number of reasons (such as demand characteristics) 
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subjects might select the misleading item even if they still remembered the original 
one. An alternative explanation for suggestibility effect, proposed by Bowers and 
Bekarian (1984) is known as the 'accessibility hypothesis', which asserts that 
misleading information decreases the accessibility of the original memory. Study with 
matched encoding and retrieval contexts by Bowers and Bekarian (1984) extended 
support to this hypothesis as the magnitude of misleading information was found 
decreased. 
 
Lindsay (1990) proposed a different explanation called 'the source misattribution 
hypothesis'. This hypothesis assumes that the post event information does not actually 
impair memory for original event; it actually creates confusion about the sources of 
the two-information. Lindsay (1990) found that in the high source discriminability 
conditions subjects did not report suggested details more often on misled items than 
they did on control items, while in the low discriminability conditions subjects 
experienced genuine source monitoring failures when they claimed that they had 
seen the suggested details in the slides. 
 
Many factors of individual differences further moderate the impact of misinformation 
(see Gallo, 2006, for a review). In a recent study many personality characteristics 
were found to interact with cognitive abilities to moderate susceptibility to 
misinformation (Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li, Moyzis, Lessard, & Dong, 2010). 
The researchers found that low cognitive abilities, being associated with personality 
characteristics of low fear of negative evaluation, low harm avoidance, high 
cooperativeness, high reward dependence, and high self-directedness, enhanced 
susceptibility to the misinformation effect. Studies have also been conducted to 
associate certain cortical activities with misinformation effect (Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 
2010). Study indicated that since sensory modalities of original and misinformation 
were different, they produced different brain activation patterns for the two sources 
of information. H. J. Eysenck (1957, 1967) explained the personality dimensions of 
extraversion-introversion based on differential arousability of cortico-reticular circuit, 
which includes the cerebral cortex, the thalamus and the ascending reticular 
activating system. He thought that this system is more readily aroused in introverts 
than in extraverts, so that introverts are more easily aroused and show higher level of 
cortical arousal. This differential arousability is believed to influence many observable 
behaviours and performance of persons holding one of the either personality 
dimensions on various types of tasks, including eyewitness memory accuracy in 
different ways. 
 
It is argued that emotional arousal causes attentional narrowing, i.e., a decrease in 
the range of cues an individual can attend to, resulting in a poorer memory for 
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peripheral aspects of an emotional event. This attentional narrowing results in 
enhancement of memory for the central facts of the event. Although emotion can 
affect memory (e.g., Heuer & Reisberg, 1990), not everyone appears to experience 
emotion to the same intensity. Larsen, Diener, & Cropanzano (1987) examined 
differences in cognitive processes during exposure to emotionally relevant stimuli 
accounted by affect intensity of the individuals. They reported that high affect 
intensity subjects reported more physical sensations and more emotional arousal in 
response to emotional slides (positive and negative) than they did to the neutral 
slides. High affect intensity subjects employed more personalizing, generalizing, and 
empathic cognitions and global and elaborate thinking. These results supported the 
idea that individuals predisposed to have strong emotional responses also had the 
tendency to deploy different type of cognitive processes when exposed to 
emotional stimuli than low affect intensity individuals. Larsen, Billings, & Cutler (1996) 
examined individual differences in cognitive interpretation of emotional situations in 
terms of active information generation. They reported that the subjects high in affect 
intensity generated descriptive information containing significantly more references 
to emotional arousal, more focus on feelings and more overgeneralization 
compared to the subjects low in affect intensity. Thus, specific cognitive processing 
could be associated with dispositional affect intensity and that people’s 
informational style is stable over time and across situations. 
 
Researches on attention and judgment have shown that discrete emotions lead to 
enhanced attention to, and accessibility of, motivationally relevant information 
(Williams, Mathews, & McLeod, 1996). Fearful people have been found to 
preferentially attend to threat related information (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) and interpret ambiguous situations as 
threatening (M. W. Eysenck, 1997). Fearful individuals flaunt enhanced memory for 
threat related information and poorer memory for threat irrelevant details (Wessel & 
Merckelbach, 1998). Enhanced memory for threatening stimuli has also been 
demonstrated in the framework of eyewitness research. The notion of weapon focus 
has been proposed to illustrate this phenomenon which refers to witnesses’ 
tendency to attend and remember the weapon used in the event and ignoring 
other fringe information (e.g., Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & 
Messo, 1987). 
 
Thus, it is evident that the dimensions of arousal have differential cognitive 
implications (Matthews, Pitcaithly, & Mann, 1995; Matthews, & Westerman, 1994; 
Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman, & Blainey, 1991). These cognitive implications 
have been largely investigated with low and high affect intensity individuals and to 
have a comprehensive understanding of the process a broader comparison is 
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required. Arousal, emotion and mood are inter-linked states (Matthews, & Deary, 
1998) and the Activation-Deactivation Adjective Checklist developed by Thayer 
(1978) assesses two dimensions of subjective arousal, referred to as energetic arousal 
and tense arousal. Energetic arousal is characterized by the dimensions of vigour 
and energy on one side, and tiredness and fatigue on the other. Tense arousal 
contrasts tension and nervousness with relaxation and calmness. Matthews, Jones 
and Chamberlain (1990) added a third dimension of hedonic tone related to the 
overall pleasantness of mood. Anger as a dimension of arousal has also been 
extensively researched and has been reported as a psychological predictor of 
chronically elevated blood pressure (Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983). 
Psychometric evidences indicate that extraversion is related positively with energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone, while it is negatively related with tense arousal. 
 
An evaluation of researches discussed here steer to believe that a threatening event 
depicting a violent sequence would be retained differentially by the individuals of 
different arousal states. Therefore, in the present experiment effects of four arousal 
states (energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration) and 
eyewitness retention scores of participants under three types of post event 
information conditions (consistent, misleading and no information) has been studied. 
At the outset, it is hypothesised that high tense arousal and anger/frustration 
participants would be more susceptible to accept misinformation than those high on 
energetic arousal and hedonic tone. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
120 extreme scorers on the Hindi adaptation of UWIST Mood State Adjective 
Checklist (Mathews, Dwivedi, A.P. Singh, Srivastava, Arora, & I. L. Singh, 1995), aged 
18 to 25 years (M=22 years and 7 months), were used as participants in this 
experiment. Those extreme scorers on each of the four arousal states of the UMS 
were selected on the basis of the statistic of M+.6745σ who scored average on the 
rest of the three arousal states. Thus, high scoring energetic arousal, tense arousal, 
hedonic tone, and anger/frustration participants formed the four groups for the 
experiment. Each of three post event information conditions comprised forty 
participants who were drawn in equal number from each of the four arousal states 
described above. Thus, each of the four groups was purely represented by high 
scorer participants on one the four arousal states. It was believed that such a design 
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could enable to make better comparison of susceptibility to accept misinformation 
among the arousal states. 
 
Materials 
 
Hindi adaptation of UWIST Mood State Adjective Checklist (Mathews, Dwivedi, A.P. 
Singh, Srivastava, Arora, & I. L. Singh, 1995) was used to select high scoring energetic 
arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone, and anger/frustration participants. The UMS 
consisted of 29 adjectives to be rated on four point scales. There were eight items 
each for energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone mood states and five 
items for anger/frustration mood state. One could obtain maximum score of 32 (with 
minimum of 8) on energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone mood state 
scales and a maximum score of 20 on anger/frustration mood state scale with a 
minimum of 5. Coefficients of internal consistency for the subscales were .87 for 
energetic arousal, .82 for tense arousal, .89 for hedonic tone, and .79 for 
anger/frustration. 
 
The to-be-witnessed event in the experiment was a video clip of 3 minutes and 15 
seconds duration. The event centred around two friends who had met after a long 
gap. During their conversation they begin quarrelling over some issue. Meanwhile, 
two persons come and one of them shoots one of the two friends. 
 
Two types of post event information were given through two versions of the narrative. 
The consistent post event information condition correctly described the event and 
items given in the test. On the other hand, the narrative of misleading post event 
information condition employed some misleading cues about the event. There was 
another group, which was given neither of the two versions of narratives. 
 
A retention test comprising 20 items regarding details of the event was constructed. 
The details which were required to recognize were the contents, people, objects, 
actions and processes of the event. Each test item was in the question form 
regarding some aspect of the event with three alternatives. One of the alternatives 
was the correct one, which really appeared in the event and also in the narrative of 
consistent post event information condition. The other two alternatives were 
incorrect; one of which was suggestive, as it did not appear in the event but it did 
find a mention in the narrative of misleading post event information condition. The 
third alternative appeared neither in the event nor in the misleading narrative. For 
example, there was an item: “How the two friends met to each other at first time in 
the event?” Three alternatives to it were: (a) By saying ‘Namaskar’ (b) By rubbing 
their shoulders (c) By shaking their hands. This particular part of the event was 
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narrated in the consistent post event information condition in these words: “The two 
friends met in a room by rubbing their shoulders” while, in the misleading post event 
information condition, it was explained in this way: “The two friends met in a room by 
shaking their hands.” 
 
Items of the test were selected in such a way that all relevant details of the event 
were well covered. Difficulty level of the test items was also checked carefully in a 
preliminary try-out and equal proportion of mild, moderate and high difficulty level 
items were included in the final test. For scoring, one score was awarded for each 
correct answer with no credit to the incorrect answer. 
 
Procedure 
 
The reported study was undertaken at the Department of Psychology, Banaras Hindu 
University, Varanasi, India which used a video clip depicting an event of murder. The 
event, as well as the complete experimental procedure, was reviewed by the 
Departmental Research Committee (DRC) which subsequently granted permission 
to use it as witness event. As per the directions of the DRC, participants of the study 
were a priori informed about emotional content of the event at the time of taking 
their consent of participation in the study. 
 
The experiment was conducted in 3 phases. 
 
Phase 1: In this phase, participants were exposed to the witnessed event via a video 
recorded clip, as described above. 
 
Phase 2: One week later, participants were given either of the two types of post 
event information, consistent or misleading, through written narratives in such a way 
that each type of post event information was supplied to one third of the 
participants. The participants of no post event information condition did not undergo 
this phase of the study; in other words they received neither consistent nor 
misleading post event information. Participants were instructed that the narrative 
was a written explanation of that event. 
 
Phase 3: Just after their reading of the narrative, participants' memory about the 
witnessed event was tested through a recognition test that contained 20 items. The 
participants in the no post event information condition received this phase without 
undergoing Phase 2. Instructions given to the research participants before the 
retention test was: “Last week, a short video film was presented before you. Here, 
some questions are given related to the incidents of that film. Each question has 
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three alternatives in the questionnaire. Select one of them on the basis of the actual 
incidents occurred in the film and mark (√) before the true answer.” Thus, they were 
clearly instructed to report about the details of the original event viewed one week 
before. 
 
Experimental Design 
 
The design of this experiment was a 3 (consistent, misleading and no post event 
information) × 4 (energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone, and anger / 
frustration participants) between subjects factorial design with ten participants in 
each of the 12 experimental conditions. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 shows that misleading post event information resulted in the lowest retention 
score (M=8.00, SD=3.28) in comparison to consistent (M=15.73, SD=1.70) or no post 
event information (M=10.23, SD=2.48). The main effect for post event information was 
significant, F(2,108)=404.66, p<.0001 (Table 2). This is also evident that high energetic 
arousal (M=14.00, SD=2.48) and hedonic tone (M=12.63, SD=3.67) participants 
retained more event details than the high tense arousal (M=9.00, SD=4.60) and 
anger/frustration (M=9.63, SD=3.74) participants. There was statistically significant 
main effect of arousal states, F(3,108)=110.04, p<.0001. 
 
Table 1: Mean eyewitness retention scores and SDs of high scorers on different 
arousal states as a function of post event information 
Arousal states 
Post event information 
Consistent Misleading No Overall 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Energetic arousal 17.00 1.15 11.90 1.29 13.10 1.00 14.00 2.48 
Tense arousal 14.90 1.20 4.50 1.27 7.50 1.18 9.00 4.60 
Hedonic tone  16.90 1.10 9.80 1.48 11.20 1.32 12.63 3.67 
Anger/Frustration 14.10 1.20 5.70 1.16 9.10 1.60 9.63 3.74 
Overall 15.73 1.70 8.00 3.28 10.23 2.48 11.31 4.14 
 
Table 1 further shows that apart from performing poor with consistent and no post 
event information, high tense arousal (M=4.50, SD=1.27) and anger/frustration 
(M=5.70, SD=1.16) participants’ eyewitness retention scores dropped more sharply 
when they were given misleading post event information in comparison to the high 
energetic arousal (M=11.90, SD=1.29) and hedonic tone (M=9.80, SD=1.48) 
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participants (Figure 1). Interaction between arousal states and types of post event 
information was also found significant, F(6,108)=8.90, p<.0001. 
 
Table 2: Summary of ANOVA for eyewitness retention scores 
Source of variance Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
PEI 1271.667 2 635.833 404.655 .000 
Arousal States 518.692 3 172.897 110.035 .000 
PEI X Arousal States 83.533 6 13.922 8.860 .000 
Error 169.700 108 1.571     
Total 17389.000 120       
 
 
Figure 1: Mean eyewitness retention scores of high scorers on different arousal states 
as a function of post event information 
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Tukey’s h.s.d. post-hoc comparisons of eyewitness accuracy among various levels of 
post event information (Table 3) revealed that the mean retention score of the 
participants receiving consistent information was significantly greater than that of 
the participants receiving misleading (p<.000) and no (p<.000) information. However, 
misled participants obtained significantly lesser eyewitness details than did the 
participants of no information group (p<.000). Comparisons among various levels of 
arousal states indicated that high energetic arousal participants retained 
significantly more eyewitness details than high tense arousal (p<.000), hedonic tone 
(p<.000) and anger/frustration (p<.000) participants. Similarly, high hedonic tone 
participants retained significantly more eyewitness details than did the high 
anger/frustration participants (p=<.000). High tense arousal participants recognized 
significantly lesser eyewitness details than did the high hedonic tone participants 
(p<.000). 
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Table 3: Post hoc multiple comparisons (Tukey's h. s. d. test) of eyewitness accuracy 
among various levels of arousal states and post event information 
I J 
Mean differences (I-
J) 
Sig. 
Post event information 
Consistent Misleading 7.75* .000 
 No 5.50* .000 
Misleading No -2.25* .000 
Arousal states 
Energetic arousal Tense arousal 5.03* .000 
 Hedonic tone 1.37* .000 
 Anger/frustration 4.37* .000 
Tense arousal Hedonic tone -3.67* .000 
 Anger/frustration -.67 .173 
Hedonic tone Anger/frustration 3.00* .000 
 
Discussion 
 
Results extend the theory that consistent post event information enhances the traces 
by the phenomenon of priming. Since both the misled and the no information 
groups did not get supportive information, there was no priming or enhancement of 
memory traces. The results lend support to memory impairment hypothesis inasmuch 
as the misleading post event information presumably erases memory of the original 
event. There is a rewriting of the event as described in the post event information. 
Consistent post event information further strengthens memory of the original event. 
However, when neither of the two post event information was given, participants' 
memory was neither erased nor strengthened. As a result the retention of the no post 
event information group remained unaltered. 
 
The effect of post event information on retention extends the theory of 
misinformation acceptance and deliberation (see Belli, 1989 and Loftus et al., 1989 
for details). Results show that the participants receiving no and misleading post 
event information accessed the original memory equally well. On the occasions 
when participants did not receive any post event information failed to remember 
the original item, they guessed the correct alternative on the basis of probability. 
However, misled participants remembered both the original and misled items and 
responded with the misled item because they trusted the experimenter's information 
than they did their own memory. They apparently performed less accurately than 
did the no post event information participants who never received any post event 
information and for whom such demand characteristics were not present also. 
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Results of the present experiment show statistically significant effect of participants’ 
arousal states on their eyewitness memory scores. Correlations among UWIST Mood 
Adjective checklist scores and measures of Curran and Cattell's (1974) Eight State 
Questionnaire (8 SQ) have shown that participants high on energetic arousal and 
hedonic tone were significantly low scorers on the 8 SQ scales of anxiety, stress and 
fatigue while, they were high scorers on extraversion (Matthews, 1987). A contrary 
pattern of correlations was found for the scores on tense arousal. Vigour-energy and 
tiredness-fatigue have been reported as key traits of energetic arousal, while 
tension-nervousness and relaxation-calmness have been shown to be key traits of 
tense arousal (Thayer, 1978). In a subsequent study, Thayer (1989) related energetic 
arousal to a general appetite or action system, whereas tension has been 
associated with a preparatory-emergency system, which is particularly sensitive to 
cognitive appraisals of danger stimuli. Here it is important to point out that the 
witnessed event employed in the present study depicted a violence sequence 
ending in a murder. The witnessed event in all likelihood resembled to a somewhat 
threatening stimulus, which presumably triggered a preparatory-emergency 
situation. The trend of results in the present study extends support to Thayer (1989). 
 
Differing explanations for anxiety related processing and attentional biases have 
been advanced. Processing stage theory of Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 
(1988) suggests that anxiety affects processing and causes highly selective attention 
with automatic and unconscious encoding. M. W. Eysenck's (1992) hyper-vigilance 
theory argues that trait anxious participants, particularly when high in state anxiety, 
tend to scan the environment for threat to an excessive degree. When a threat is 
detected, they tend to 'lock on to' the threat stimulus and their focus of attention is 
narrowed. Wells and Matthews (1994) have identified emotional distress with a 
cognitive-attentional syndrome generated by a 'Self-Referent Executive Function'. 
High trait anxious individual's attentional functioning is characterized by self-focused 
attention and his processing effort is diverted to worry and ruminative emotion-
focused coping. The syndrome includes the activation of strategies for allocation of 
attention, which prioritises processing of threat-related stimuli and the person 
monitors the threats congruent with his personal concerns.  
 
The processes of focused, narrowed and selective attention discussed in the theories 
stated above adequately explain the results of the present experiment where the 
participants with different levels in the traits of anxiety, tension, stress, energy, vigour 
and fatigue were found to account their differential memory accuracy. Participants 
who scored high on the scale of tense arousal were presumably higher in their traits 
of anxiety and stress and the event used in the present study further raised their state 
anxiety, which resulted in extreme level of focussing and narrowing of their attention. 
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The view of 'weapon focusing' also assumes that while witnessing a violent event 
attention is focused on the weapon and other details of the event are ignored or 
overlooked. This phenomenon of weapon focusing becomes prevalent in high trait 
anxious participants. They attained and encoded such threatening stimuli with their 
personal concerns, but only on the expense of other details which resulted in their 
lower eyewitness memory accuracy (Hulse, & Memon, 2006).  
 
On the contrary, high energetic arousal and hedonic tone participants were 
presumably low on trait anxiety and high in energy. Therefore, no such narrowing 
and focusing of attention occurred in them, which resulted in their better eyewitness 
memory accuracy. Energy has been reported to be associated with enhanced 
performance on a range of attentionally demanding tasks (Mathews & Westerman, 
1994). Energetically aroused participants paid adequate attention to the entire 
range of stimuli present in the event and therefore, participant's scores on the 
memory test were significantly higher than that of the high tense aroused and 
anger/frustration participants. 
 
Results of the experiment reported here unequivocally support the view that 
misleading post event information impairs the memory for details of an emotional 
event and susceptibility to accept the misinformation also varies across the four 
arousal states of the research participants. However, the study was conducted in the 
laboratory situation, while eyewitness accounts pertain to the naturalistic settings. 
The duration of the event was also very little, while in actual scenario the events take 
considerably longer time. In addition to high scorer participants for the four arousal 
states, the experimental treatments could also be expanded by selecting low scorer 
participants for a comprehensive comparison among the four arousal states. In 
addition to the subjective arousal, measurement of physiological arousal of the 
participants could be taken to comprehensively decipher the role of arousal in 
susceptibility to accept misinformation. Finally, participants used in this experiment 
were of a particular age group (early adults) and therefore, any generalization 
about others becomes difficult. It is suggested that further studies steering clear of 
these limitations may be planned to better understand the complex nature of 
eyewitness memory. 
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